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Executive Summary  
 
The report is designed to portray the ways in which ethno-cultural and religious diversity has 
been so far managed by modern Turkish state with regard to the usage of the discourse of 
tolerance. Explicating the construction of the Turkish national identity and the modern 
Turkish state, the report primarily deliniates the constitutive elements of the state machinery 
as well as the technologies of citizenship. Turkey’s process of Europeanization is also 
scrutinized in order to pave the way to a throughout analysis of the transformation of the 
Turkish polity from the Cold War years to the Post-Cold War years. In doing so, major 
challenges against the traditional Kemalist nation-state building process such as political 
islam, Alevi revival, Kurdish revival and Europeanization/globalization are discussed. 
Subsequently, some information is given regarding the major ethno-cultural and religious 
minorities in Turkey.  
The term ‘minority’ is a very polemical concept in Turkey, and has a negative connotation in 
the popular imagery as it is often recalled as the main source of the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire. The popular assumption of the Turkish nationalist myth-making is that it is the non-
Muslim minorities collaborating with the colonial European powers who contributed to the 
death of the Ottoman Empire through the syndrom of ‘enemy within’. The report deploys the 
term not only through its legal definition but also its sociological/anthropological 
connotations.  
The definition of tolerance is confined to the acceptance of Sunni Muslims and their secular 
counterparts under the banner of the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish nation. However, it does not 
mean to embrace all different kinds of ethno-cultural and religious minorities. Toleration in 
the Ottoman context as well as in other imperial contexts refers to the “absence of 
persecution of people but not their acceptance into society as full and welcomed members of 
community”. This report argues that toleration is actually nothing but a form of 
governmentality, designed to maintain peace and order in multi-ethnic and multi-
nominational contexts. The Ottoman imperial experience and the Turkish national experience 
approve that the Turkish nation tolerate those non-Muslims, non-Sunni-Muslims and non-
Turks as long as they did not disturb or go against the Sunni-Islam-Turkish order. If ethno-
cultural and religious minorities did transgress, their recognition could easily turn into 
suppression and persecution. 
The concept of tolerance has a very long history in the Turkish context tracing back to the 
Ottoman Empire. It also has a very popular usage in everyday life. Turks are usually proud of 
referring to the Millet System of the Ottoman Empire, whihc is often portrayed in the popular 
imagery as the guarantor of tolerance, respecting the boundaries between religious 
communities. Such an official discourse is still vibrant in contemporary Turkey. However, this 
report tries to argue that tolerance is nothing but a myth in Turkey. The myth of tolerance has 
been functional to conceal the mistreatment of ethno-cultural and religious minorities other 
than the majority of Sunni-Muslim-Turks in Turkey. Those remaining outside the boundaries 
of the holy trinity of Sunni-Muslim-Turks are bound to be subject to the patronizing and 
tolerant gaze of the majority nation.  
The report claims that there is no problem of (in-)tolerance in Turkey as long as those non-
Sunni, non-Muslim, and/or non-Turkish minorities accept to be second-class citizens. The 
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celebration of the Armenian millet in the Ottoman Empire as the “millet-i sadika” (loyal 
nation) is actually a confirmation of the fact that loyalty to the Empire paves the way for the 
non-Muslim minorities to toleration. On the other hand, those non-Turks (Kurds, Circassians, 
Laz etc.) and non-Sunnis (Alevis), who claim to be the constitutive elements of the modern 
nation in Turkey, are not in search of tolerance from the majority nation. Turkish nation-
building process based on the collective acts of various constitutive elements (mainly 
Muslims) vis-a-vis Christians (mainly Greeks and Armenians) and their  European allies in 
the course of the Independence War in the early 1920s became more exclusionary in the 
course of time, and it excluded Kurds, Circassians, Alevis, Arabs, Laz and several other 
Muslim origin minorities in a way that ethnicized the nation. Ethnification of the nation since 
the early 1930s is a common practice in Turkey, alienating the non-Turkish and non-Sunni 
groups of Muslim background, who are still engaged in the discourse of ‘constitutive element 
of the nation’ and who do not want to be considered as ‘second class citizens’. This is still an 
unresolved issue. 
The term tolerance has become more viable in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of the 
European Union in 1999. The report also claims that there is a parallel between the neo-
liberal form of governmentality and the rhetoric of tolerance, both of which lead to 
culturalization of what is political and social. Against this background, it is maintained that 
Turkey’s European integration process undertaken by the Justice and Development Party rule 
seems to go in line with this neo-liberal form of governmentality, underlining that Turkey’s 
moderate Islamic character can be used as a bridging element between the so-called 
Christian and Islamic civilizations at the expence of reducing civilization to religion. 
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1.Introduction 
 
Having the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey, with more than 72 million 
inhabitants, is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, housing approximately 50 different 
Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethno-cultural groups: Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, 
Alevi Kurds, Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians etc. 
(Andrews, 1992). However, leaving aside the attempts made for democratisation of the 
country in the last decade, the Turkish state has been far from recognising the ethnically and 
culturally diverse nature of the Turkish society. Ethno-cultural and religious minorities in 
Turkey have been subject to homogenising state policies.   
As Turkey is a republican country, one could not find official figures about the numbers of 
ethno-cultural and religious minorities. The draft report is designed to portray the ways in 
which ethno-cultural and religious diversity has hitherto been managed by modern Turkish 
state within the framework of the discourse of tolerance. Explicating the construction of the 
Turkish national identity and the modern Turkish state, the report will primarily delineate the 
constitutive elements of the state machinery as well as the technologies of citizenship. 
Turkey’s process of Europeanization will also be scrutinized in order to pave the way to a 
detailed analysis of the transformation of the Turkish polity from the Cold War years to the 
Post-Cold War years. In doing so, major challenges against the traditional Kemalist nation-
state building process will be scrutinized such as political islam, Alevi revival, Kurdish 
revival and Europeanization/globalization. Subsequently, some statistical information will be 
given regarding the major ethno-cultural and religious minorities. The term ‘minority’ has a 
delicate history in Turkey, as it often has negative connotation in the popular imagery. In the 
text, the term ‘minority’ will be used in both legal and sociological/anthropological 
framework.  
 
Ottoman multiculturalism was usually coupled with the term ‘tolerance’. The popularity of 
the term ‘tolerance’ is still to be found in the contemporary Turkish context, whereby Turks 
are proud to be vocalizing their toleration vis-a-vis ethno-culturally and religiously different 
groups and individuals. However, the very etymological meaning of ‘tolerance’ jeopardizes 
the idea of multiculturalism. The etymology of the term ‘tolerance’ is also very illustrative to 
understand what it contains. It does not seem to be accidental that in most languages in which 
tolerance has been historically debated, the words tolerance (or its synonym, sufferance) and 
suffering have the same source. The Latin word tolerantia comes from tolere, to bear, and 
tolerate, to suffer, endure, and the same link exists in English (through the synonym, 
sufferance), in French (souffrir), Italian (soffrire), and even in Hebrew (sevel--sovlanut). This 
etymological fact happens to be philosophically significant. It indicates that there is no 
tolerance without suffering and its overcoming. Tolerating someone means recognizing an 
irreducible difference, a gap of alienness separating us, which nevertheless is accepted 
(Yovel, 1998). This implies a concealed hatred or contest between the tolerating and the 
tolerated party. By this very otherness, the other represents a challenge to the self in the form 
of a potential competition over goods, power, moral values, and so on.  
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In French, there are many words revolving around ‘tolérer’ such as permettre (permission), 
souffrir (sufferance), endurer (endure) and accorder (accord). The word ‘tolérer’ was first 
used in France in 1562 by the Catholic French King to somehow let the Protestants stay in the 
country. The term was basically suggested by the King to set up a policy toward many types 
of evil and heresy like the Protestants and Jews. The term ‘permettre’ had even more positive 
connotations than the word ‘tolérer’, which was very negatively loaded. However, both terms 
revealed common assumptions about the nature of political power vis-à-vis the Church: 
control from above, surveillance of individuals’ beliefs, and organized pressure. Furthermore, 
the term Toleranz was used in German, and tolerantie in Dutch before tolerance became 
common in France, the Low Countries, and Switzerland.
1
 Against this background, this paper 
shall claim that ‘tolerance’ is nothing but a myth in Turkey as in other countries. 
 
 
2.Nation, State and Citizenship in Turkey 
 
Since the beginning of the nation-state building process, the primary goal of the main 
constituents of the Turkish Republic had been the establishment of a homogenous nation and 
a unitary state.  In order to achieve this goal, Mustafa Kemal and the military/political elite 
equipped the state with a superior power over the civil society. Serif Mardin (1975) puts 
special emphasis on the statist and centralist character of the Republic in its founding years. 
He underlines that the Republic was ‘diffident’ in integrating the social forces into the central 
political system although the local notables, who took part in the National Independence War, 
and formed a significant component of the first Grand National Assembly, were incorporated 
into the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the bureaucracy (Mardin, 1975: 22-27). To this 
aim, some religious, ethnic and local claims such as Kurdish Sheihk Sait rebellion (1925) and 
the Islamist Menemen revolt (a district of Izmir), were suppressed by the state elite on the 
ground that the social forces were regarded as the sources of decentralisation and political 
rivalry (ibid., 23).  Therefore, Mardin argues that rather than integration of the social forces 
into the centre through mobilisation of the masses, the Republican idea to restructure the 
society was confined to the bureaucratisation and regulation (ibid.). Hence, the Kemalist elite 
preferred achieve the goal of forming the unitary state and a homogenous nation by means of 
preserving the state’s raison d’étre, and adopting policies to suppress, assimilate and exclude 
diverse societal groupings along religious, ethnic and cultural lines.  
In order to maintain the dominance of the state in political and social structuring over its 
social rivals, Mustafa Kemal and the state elite adopted  policies and programmes to 
homogenise linguistic, historical and cultural features of the Turkish society and to construct a 
‘new national identity’. Ataturk defined the Turkish nation as “the Turkish people forming the 
Turkish Republic”. By this statement, he elucidated that every individual who participated in 
the establishment of the Republic and took a share in the future of it is a Turk (Özbudun, 
1981: 18). Ataturk’s definition of the Turkish nation embraces all the people who live in the 
lands of Anatolia and Thrace, and feel to be a part of the past and the future of the Republic. 
That is why, his conception of Turkish nation avoids the distinction of any social segment 
along with religion, ethnicity, and sectarianism. In this sense, the republican Kemalist elite 
were difference-blind, and did not recognise ethno-cultural diversity of the Turkish nation 
(Kaya, 2007).  
                                                     
1 For further debate on the early history of the word  ‘tolérer’,  see Huseman (1984). 
  
 
The defining distinctiveness of the early Republic was Turkification policies, which sought 
the dominance of Turkishness and Sunni Islam as the defining elements in every walk of life, 
from the language spoken in the public space to citizenship, national education, trade regime, 
personnel regime in public enterprises, industrial life and even settlement laws (Aktar, 1996). 
Having an imperial legacy, many such new regulations and laws referred to a set of attempts 
to homogenise the entire nation without any tolerance for difference. It is highly probable 
that the underestimation of ethno-cultural diversity among the Muslim population of the 
Republic was due to the preceding Ottoman Millet system borrowed by the republican 
political elite. The Millet system did not consider ethnic differences among Muslims. All 
Muslims, regardless of their other differences, belonged to the one and the same ‘Muslim 
nation’. Paradoxically, the successful nature of the Turkish revolution/rupture lays in the 
continuity of the Ottoman notion of millet.
2
  
In the years to come following the formation of the Republic, assimilationist and/or 
exclusionary policies of the state elite, which sought to erase social and cultural diversity, 
continued to render the national identity based on Sunni Islam and Turkishness a dominant 
role in social and political spheres. The social forces affiliated with diverse religious, ethnic 
and cultural values were frequently faced with and suppressed by the homogenising policies 
such as the naitonalist Turkish history thesis of 1932, the Sun Language Theory of 1936, the 
unitarian nationalist education policies (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu,1924), banning the use of 
mother tongue and of ethnic minority names, disriminatory settlement policies put in effect on 
the exchange minorities and new migrants (İskan Kanunu, 1934), discriminatory citizenship 
laws granting citizenship exclusively to Muslim origin migrants, the imposition of Wealth 
Tax in 1942, especially on non-Muslims, and the forced migration of Kurds in the east and 
southeast of Turkey (Kaya,  2007). Ethno-cultural minorities adopted different means to cope 
with the challenge of the state’s homogenising policies. They generated their own individual 
identities in accordance with these assimilationist and/or exclusionary policies. Within the 
framework of the majority nationalism, ethnic and cultural minorities chose to be involved in 
the project of the construction of a homegenous Turkish nation, disguised their ethnic 
identities in the public, and identified themselves as a constitutive element of the Turkish 
nation.  
 
Subsequent to the primary goal of the formation of a homogenous nation and a unitary state, 
the state elite pointed at the modern and secular character of the state.
3
 Without a macro 
socio-economic transformation, a total cultural change through the adoption of the Kemalist 
version of Westernisation and secularism required the state elite to construct ‘an imagined 
Turkish nation’ in line with the interests of the unitary and bureaucratic state (Sakallıoğlu, 
1996). In its configuration of secularism, the Kemalist elite did not only accommodate the 
Islamist identity of the individual but also dispersed the individual identity under the banner 
of the modern and secular Turkish nation (ibid.). In doing so, they ensured that the individual 
will was secondary to national will, and also precluded that Islam as a social power could be 
                                                     
2 Similarly, Ibrahim Kaya asserts that Kemalism did not achieve an absolute rupture with the Ottoman legacy, and “it did not 
bring about a completely new Turkey- a Western nation” (Kaya, 2004: 149). 
3 For the Kemalist mode of secularism as a means to the project of modernist nationalism see Göle (1997), Keyman (1995), 
and Cizre (1996). 
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organised as a challenge to the unitary and bureaucratic state (ibid.). Relying on the 
‘bureaucratic code’, the state elite instrumentalised secularism, which was conceptualised as 
the separation of politics and religion both in public and private spheres, in order to 
consolidate the central state power against the potential threat of social forces affiliated with 
Islamic values and aims.  
It should be noted that there is a debate over the definition of Turkish citizenship, for instance 
“while some argue that the formal definition of Turkish citizenship is based on territoriality 
rather than ethnicity (Kirişçi 2000), for some, Turkish citizenship oscillates between political 
and ethnicists logic (Yeğen 2004; Kadıoğlu 2007). The historical evidence shows that 
citizenship policies of Turkey were civic republican in rhetoric. The first citizenship law of 
1928 gave citizenship to all those residing within the boundaries of the republic on the basis 
of jus soli principle. However, it has gradually become ethno-cultural in nature embraced by 
jus sanguinis principle. Retrospectively speaking, ethnic groups in Turkey such as Kurds, 
Circassians, Alevis, Armenians, Lazis and Arabs have developed various political 
participation strategies vis-à-vis the legal and political structure and delimitations.  
Turkey’s Europeanization process has also brought about various challenges against the 
prescribed definitions of the nation and citizen, a point we will come back shortly.However, 
the process of modernization and Europeanization of Turkey dates back to the early 19
th
 
century. The journey has always been full of impediments as the process was a rather 
politically oriented one leading to the emergence of social divides/faultlines within the nation. 
The rise of the JDP in Turkey has made some remarkable changes in the western oriented-
civilizational discourse of the Turkish political establishment. Having a pro-Islamist 
discourse, the JDP is now trying to generate a multi-level governance in both domestic and 
international platform, and willing to become a soft-power in her region embracing all the 
countries in the Middle East, Caucassus, Balkans and North Africa. It seems that such an 
attempt, which makes the Islamic inclinations of the JDP very apparent, is also appreciated by 
the European Union circles. However, it is uncertain if such inclinations of the JDP are 
destined to make Turkey a member of the EU in the end.  
 
Turkey has experienced one of the steadiest periods in the history of the Republic between 
1999 and 2005. At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the European Heads of State and 
Government for the first time offered Turkey the concrete prospect of full membership of the 
European Union, more than four decades after its application for association with the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959. Subsequently in 1963, Turkey had 
signed the Ankara Agreement, which foresaw the establishment of a Customs Union between 
Turkey and the EEC. Although the Customs Union was an economic cooperation model, 
Article 28 of the Agreement stipulated to Turkey’s membership as a long term goal. 
Accordingly, this stipulation had reflections on the political realm; economic interests of 
elites had a “conditioning effect” on democracy (Keyman and Öniş, 2007: 61). In 1987, 
Turkey applied for full EEC membership. Although Turkey was deemed eligible for 
membership, in 1989 the Opinion of the Commission stated that the there were several 
economic and political difficulties that needed to be addressed before membership, “such as 
the expansion of political pluralism, the state of democracy, the persistence of disputes with a 
Member State (namely Greece), the lack of a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, relative 
economic backwardness, especially in macroeconomic terms, the Kurdish question, and 
problems related to human rights (Müftüler-Baç, 2000: 23). However, the official reason for 
this rejection was the internal dynamic of the EEC, namely the undergoing process of 
establishing a single market. 
  
 
Table 1: The Main Minority Groups in Turkey and their Dimensions of Difference 
Dimensions Of 
Difference 
Indigenous 
people of 
Anatolia 
Ethnically Different 
from Turks 
Religiously Different 
from 
Sunni Muslims 
Linguistically 
Different 
from Turkish 
Non-Muslim 
Minorities 
    
Armenians √ √ √ (Gregorian Orthodox, 
Chatolic, Protestant) 
√ 
Jewish  √  (the Sefarad Jews) √ √  (Ladino) 
Greek √ √ √  (Greek Orthodox) √ 
Assyrians √ √ √  (Syriac Christians) √ 
Protestants diverse diverse √ diverse 
Muslim Minorities 
and Immigrants 
    
Arabs     
Sunni Arabs √ √  √ 
Alevi Arabs (the 
same minority as 
Arabic speaking 
Alevis) 
√ √ √ √ 
Alevis     
Azarbaijani speaking √  √  (similar to Shia) √(Azerbaijani 
dialect of 
Turkish) 
Arabic speaking (the 
same minority as 
Alevi Arabs) 
√ √ √  (the Alevi belief of the  
Syrian Nusayri 
community) 
√  (Arabic) 
Turkmen Alevis 
(Turkish speaking) 
√  √  
Zazas (Zaza and 
Kurdish speaking) 
√ √ √ √ (Zaza or 
Kurdish) 
Kurds     
Zaza Kurds (the 
same minority as 
Zaza  Alevis) 
√ √ √  (Alevi) √ (Zaza and 
Kurdish 
speaking) 
Kurds speaking 
Kurmanci 
√ √  √ (Kurmanci 
dialect of 
Kurdish) 
Balkan Immigrants     
Bosnians  √ (Slavic)  Bosniac-
Turkish 
Pomaks  √ (Slavic)  Bulgarian-
Turkish 
Torbes  √ (Slavic)  Turkish 
Albanians  √ (Slavic)  Albanian-
Turkish 
Roma community  √ Diverse Roma-Turkish 
Caucasian 
Immigrants 
    
Circassians  √  Adigey, 
Abkaz 
Georgians  √  Georgian 
Laz √ √  Laz 
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3. Cultural Diversity Challenges 
 
In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, Kemalist ideology encountered various challenges 
originating from ethno-cultural and religious groups. This was the time when the Kemalist 
rhetorique of nationalism, which was based on a retrospective narrative holding the Muslim 
origin nation together against the syndrome of common enemy of imperialist European 
powers, was challenged by its major taboos: Islam, Kurds, Alevis, globalization and 
liberalization. In what follows, these challenges will be scrutinized. 
 
 
3.1. The Rise of Political Islam in the 1980s: Islamist Forces becoming integral parts of the   
regime 
 
 
State-centric Kemalist regime was confronted with the challenge of ethno-cultural and 
religious groups in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup (Keyman and Önis, 2007:16). The 
military coup and the policies undertaken by the military government until 1983 revealed that 
the military elite made a profound attempt to eradicate the sources of social strife emerging 
from the conflict between the rightists and leftists, and between diverse ethno-cultural 
communities in the 1970s, and to rebuild the social-political cohesion (Cizre, 1996: 245-246). 
For this purpose, the military elite began to pursue a project of restructuring the society in a 
way that the conservative and Islamist sources of culture were accommodated into the 
homogenous modern Turkish national identity (ibid.).  
 
In parallel with the invocation of the Islamist aspects in the national culture, the policy of 
economic liberalisation was regarded as a necessary means to structure a new social and 
economic order. Both the accommodation of the Islamist forces and the economic 
liberalisation were expected to avoid the polarisation and fragmentation among the political 
parties supported by the diverse social forces contesting to obtain resources and to shape the 
social order (ibid.). It is in this political context after the 1980 coup that it became possible to 
see the Islamist forces, values and themes more pervasively involved in various areas of 
formal political and social spheres. For instance, the Islamist orders and communities (sufi 
tarikats) infiltrated into the political parties, government, civil service, and the business and 
banking sectors. Moreover, the Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who was backed up by the 
military in the formation of the new conservative and economically liberal order, met the 
leaders of some Sufi tarikats for the Friday prayer. Mandatory religious instruction in primary 
and secondary schools was introduced by the military regime led by Kenan Evren (ibid., 244).  
 
However, the state’s project of restructuring the political society was embedded in an implicit 
‘double discourse’. One aim of the military government in the project of reorganising the 
society was the integration of social forces into the political system, and the other was the 
enhancement of the state’s role in politics. To put it differently, the military government 
undertook a macro socio-economic transformation, whereby it attempted to create a 
homogenous and cohesive society unified in Islamic and nationalist identity under the 
circumstances of liberal economy, on the one hand. On the other, it was committed to 
strengthen the state’s control over the political and social realms. That is to say that although 
the introduction of free market economy  both in economic and social spheres such as the 
  
privatisation of mass media stimulated the mobilisation of social forces and the proliferation 
of civil society, it also impeded the democratic consolidation by containing the political 
activity of the civil society within the channels of political participation (Toprak, 1988:126-
127).   
In order to enhance the state’s role in politics, the military government initiated the enactment 
of an electoral law, by which it adopted the 10 % national threshold in order to preclude the 
participation of the ideologically oppositional parties in the competitive politics (Özbudun, 
2000: 75). The military government also enacted some articles of the 1982 constitution and 
other laws, whereby it outlawed cooperation between political parties and other civil society 
institutions aiming at demobilising the working class and depoliticising the civil society (ibid., 
27).  Therefore, it can be argued that the enhanced state’s control over the political and social 
spheres eliminated a civil society autonomous from the state, in which social forces could be 
mobilised into major oppositional groups organised along ethno-cultural lines as a challenge 
to the unitary state and the republican regime (ibid.).  
The Islamist forces incorporated into the new socio-economic order in which the big business 
circles in the centre and in the peripheral Anatolian petite bourgeoisie circles integrated and 
coexisted within the structure of liberal economy (Shambayati, 1994: 316). Hence, they were 
used by the new state elite to counterbalance the leftists and highly mobilised urban working 
class (Özbudun, 2000: 26-27). The Islamist forces did not emerge as a challenge to the secular 
and republican regime, they rather became an integral part constituting and maintaining the 
status quo of the liberal and capitalist order, which enabled the military and state elite to 
sustain the political regime.  
 
3.2. New Challenges in the 1990s: Ethno-Religious Claims 
The political context of the 1990s showed a different character from the 1980s, whereby the 
enhancement of the state’s role in politics proved to be counter-productive. While the state’s 
control over the political and social realms prevailed, ethno-cultural and religious minorities 
mobilised a politics of identity in reaction to the state’s restriction of political participation. 
Ethno-cultural and religious communities, which were already integrated into the regime in 
the 1980s, could not participate in the political process to the extent that they could manifest 
their dissidence against the inequality and injustice in the distribution of resources within the 
restricted liberal system.  
Due to the lack of the political will and capacity of the coalition governments of the 1990s in 
management of the economic liberalisation in technological and organisational terms, the 
opportunities of the open and free market economy did not assure sustained economic growth 
and were not equally allocated to every segment of the society (Keyman and Önis, 2007: 
136). Both the rapid integration to the world economy and the poor management of the 
economic liberalisation gave rise to economic crises and problems of inequality and poverty 
(ibid., 244). Social segments which were marginalised and deprived by the unjust features of 
the liberal economy protested against the deteriorating effects of the socio-economic structure 
such as poverty, unemployment, corruption, social injustice and ‘the moral decay’ (Kaya, 
2007).  
Another factor which played a significant role in the rise of the politics of identity by which 
political mobilisation was stimulated and formed along ethno-cultural and religious lines was 
the process of globalisation. The transformation to the free market economy and broader 
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interaction with the world societies also created an impetus for the proliferation of liberal, 
democratic and pluralistic ideas in the political realm as well as to the cultivation of social 
mobilisation in civil society.  
However, the Turkish political regime based on the priority of state and the restricted political 
participation was not able to respond to the demands for fostering a political system 
promoting democracy, pluralism and civil society required by the liberalisation process. 
Fragmentation embedded in the globalisation process provided the marginalised and 
oppressed social groups with an informal social-economic structure by which they were able 
to mobilise in the political context of restricted participation and devalued left-right axis and 
to fight against the inequalities of the liberal economy and the complexities of the urban life 
(Özbudun and Hale, 2009:35). Hence, it is crucial to present that his period has witnessed 
three major social movements challenging the authority of the traditional political centre: 
political Islam, Alevi revivalism, and Kurdish nationalism. 
 
3.2.i. Political Islam as a Challenge to the Kemalist Regime 
 
The emergence of the Welfare Party with an Islamic social base and political agenda posed a 
profound challenge to the state-centric, republican and secular regime in both political and 
cultural terms. The Welfare Party (WP, Refah Partisi) and the broader social network of the 
Islamist movement sought to respond to the inequalities of the global and liberal system by 
transcending the state and mobilising the marginalised and underprivileged social groups 
within an expanding Islamic civil society (umma) and the framing structure of identity 
politics. The WP tried to generate its electoral support from a broad Islamist social network 
both by supporting the socio-economic opportunity structures for the social integration of the 
Islamist forces into the growing liberal economy and the competitive urban life and by 
channelling their interests and demands to the national politics through political parties. Like 
the Islamist movements in the other Middle Eastern countries,  Islamist communities, Sufi 
orders (tarikats) and Islamic welfare associations provided a network for the marginalised 
classes, in which they were provided with sources of social services including employment, 
religious and secular education, health services, food, cloth and coal supplies which the 
nation-state failed to provide to a large extent thanks to the unmanaged transition to the liberal 
economy (Özbudun, 2009 : 16-18).  
It should be noticed that the Islamist political mobilisation appealed both to the winners and 
losers of the global and liberal economy in the sense that the newly emerging Islamic 
bourgeoisie, which underwent a continuous integration into the liberal system since the 1980s, 
distributed to the poor the wealth raised from the publishing houses, private media channels, 
university preparation courses, Islamic banks and financial institutions and holding companies 
(ibid., 13). Through its connections with these Islamist communities, the WP attracted the 
votes of the Islamic bourgeoisie, the upper middle class and the marginalised lower class and 
also stimulated political mobilisation of the conservative and Islamist social forces, which 
dramatically challenged the republican and secular segments (ibid.).   
In regard with the unacceptability and intolerance of the dominant regime towards the 
Islamist forces, the military elite and the coalition government led by the WP in 1997 
confronted some crises. The WP posed some challenges to the secular regime with its 
demands articulating Islamic values and purposes in the political life involving the exercise of 
the Islamic law, the segregation of sexes in social life, religious education and the headscarf 
  
issue. Analysing the demands of the WP for the incorporation of Islam into formal politics, it 
should be underlined that what the WP was seeking was the acquisition of state power and the 
formation of an Islamic social order from above rather than mere toleration for the 
recognition of freedom of religion and conscience and the protection of religious rights such 
as the wearing of headscarf and religious cloths in public places (Özbudun, 2009: 7-9).  
Within the legal and institutional framework, the military/bureaucratic state elite made it 
explicit that the WP’s Islamist demands cannot be tolerated as the military gave a harsh 
ultimatum to the party in the meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on the February 
28, 1997 and the party was closed down on the January 16, 1998 by a Constitutional Court 
decision in the following year (ibid., 4). The WP and the Islamist forces constituted a 
religious and cultural challenge to the republican and secular dominant regime and segments 
of the society. Their challenge was manifested in the legal and institutional frameworks in 
that the WP suggested the introduction of a new legal implementation, whereby each legal 
community would be governed in accordance with its own religious rules. In doing so, it 
asserted a return to the Medina Covenant of the Prophet Muhammed’s time, the age of 
happiness (asr-ı saadet), whereby a kind of multiculturalism based on religious differences 
was experienced (ibid., 7-8).  
In the social and economic spheres as an everyday practice, the WP also attempted to 
undermine the secular and Western order and to alter it in a way that it could also embrace the 
social forces, which had a religious and Islamic way of living. Therefore, the WP and Islamist 
forces posed a religious and cultural diversity challenge both in their attempt to stimulate 
social integration and political participation of the Islamist segments into the republican and 
secular establishment and to Islamize the society and culture in the legal and institutional 
framework and everyday practices. However, the state elite and dominant secular segments 
reacted to this challenge of the WP immediately, and showed their intolerance towards the 
Islamist forces by purging them from the formal political sphere.   
 
3.2.ii. Alevi Revivalism 
 
The other challenge to the republican state and the myth of homogenous nation rose from the 
Alevi community. After the adoption of the caliphate institution by the Sublime Port in the 
16
th
 century, the Ottoman Sultan, Yavuz Sultan Selim, imposed the dominance of the Sunni 
Islamic tradition over various religious groups in Anatolia (Erman and Erdemir, 2008). As a 
consequence of these assimilationist and suppressive policies, Alevis were compelled to 
develop a protective attitude towards their own community and identity by living in small 
social enclosures in rural areas (ibid.)
4
. In the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire, Islam 
was the main constitutive element (Yıldız, 2001). The Millet system did not distinguish 
between the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman with regard to ethno-cultural differences. All 
Muslims, regardless of their differences, belonged to the one and the same ‘Muslim nation’ 
(ibid.). Thereby, Alevis were also imagined as the integral subjects of the ‘Sunni Muslim 
nation’ (Kaya, 2004a).  
Throughout the nation-state building process, the state elite also followed the Ottoman 
heritage of the ‘Millet system’ imposing the dominance of the Sunni Islam (ibid.). In order to 
achieve the goal of the Kemalist mode of modernisation, the republican political elite 
                                                     
4 For more information about Alevis, see Appendix. 
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implemented policies for the secularisation of the political and social life (Göle, 1997). One of 
these policies was the abolishment of any kind of place for religious communion and practice 
other than mosques without taking into consideration the Cemevis, dervish lodges and special 
places for Alevi communion (Erman and Erdemir, 2008). For this reason, Alevi communities 
were deprived of the places where they could be organised into a religious community as an 
alternative to the Sunni communities (ibid.).  
Moreover, by the entitlement of all the religious affairs to the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet) accountable to the Prime Minister’s Office, the Alevis were subject to the decisions 
made by this institution on all matters of religious life (ibid.). It is also worth noting that the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs gradually turned into a state institution instrumentalised to 
impose and diffuse the values and practices of the dominant Sunni Islam (ibid.). The 
transition to the multi-party politics did not bring about a radical challenge to the dominant 
republican and secular regime based on the homogenous Sunni-Turkish nation. Rather, the 
Democrat Party which emerged as the opposition to the Kemalist Republican People Party, 
had embraced the dominant Sunni Islamic discourse, mobilised the Sunni conservatism, made 
connections with Sunni sufi sheikhs and returned to the Arabic prayer’s call (ibid.) in 1950s. 
Thus, we can draw the argument that throughout the Republican history, both the state and the 
society regarded Alevis as intolerable or difficult to tolerate or accept as they posed a 
challenge to the dominant Sunni Muslim order.   
In order to overcome the marginalising discourses and practices of the dominant classes of the 
urban life, Alevis who migrated to the big cities attempted to reproduce their communities 
and to build solidarity networks through ‘hemsehrilik’ (fellowship) associations and 
affiliations, and became intensely engaged in identity politics (Erman and Aydemir, 2008). 
Furthermore, in 1990s, a slight change in the state discourse for the re-alignment with the 
Alevis against the emerging political Islam and Kurdish nationalists also contributed to the 
‘awakening of the Alevis’, who mobilised through social networks, solidarity associations and 
identity politics. In parallel with the shift in the state discourse, one case to show the rise of 
tolerance is that Alevi and Sunni intellectuals signed a ‘declaration of being Alevi’, which 
was published in the Daily Cumhuriyet (Yavuz, 1999:180-199). Similarly, in the 1999 local 
elections, the Alevis took an initiative to form a ‘Democratic Peace Movement’ led by a 
businessman, Ali Haydar Veziroglu, and later a political party called ‘the Peace Party’ 
(Erman and Erdemir, 2008).  
Despite the state discourse for the re-alignment with the Alevis and the common initiatives of 
the Sunnis secularists and Alevis to accommodate cultural and religious diversity, in this 
decade, one could also find obvious examples illustrating the cases of intolerance and 
conflict. As an ethno-class group, the Alevi community living in the squatters of the shanty 
town Gazi at the periphery of Istanbul emerged as a resistance grouping, which considered 
their Alevi identity superior to the Turkish national identity as opposed to the moderate Alevis 
seeking a democratic, pluralistic and peaceful movement (Kaya, 2009a). The Alevi 
community of Gazi neighbourhood identified themselves with aspects such as distrustful and 
sceptic of the bureaucracy, the state authorities, the politicians and the municipal 
governments, which ignored the grievances and the lack of social services there as a result of 
their ‘Othering’ the ‘poor and different’ Alevis (ibid.).  
This conflict between the dominant classes and the culturally and religiously different 
underclass Alevis of the urban life took place in an armed clash in Gazi neighbourhood. In 
March 1995, an unknown person fired at the people in three coffee houses and one of them 
died and 20 of them were seriously injured. The neighbourhood people were involved in an 
  
armed conflict with the police forces, which were late to intervene and thus seen as 
responsible for the attack. At the end of the clash between the Alevis and the police in the 
neighbourhood, 15 people were killed by the policemen (Kaya, 2001). This case of armed 
conflict between the security forces and the marginalised Alevis revealed that the level of 
social intolerance, suspicion and hatred increases when the dichotomy between Sunni-
Muslim-Turkish majority and the ethno-religious groups and minorities such as the Alevis 
was re-emphasised, and the gap between the rich and the poor was widened.    
3.2.iii. Kurdish Revivalism 
 
At the end of 1980s, political parties which represented the Kurdish identity and defended the 
Kurdish cultural and political rights began to enter the formal political sphere. Under the Ozal 
government, the abolition of the articles of the law 765 of the Turkish Penal Code, which 
restricted the freedom of expression, laid the ground for the formation of legal ethnic and 
religious parties (Sahin, 2008:134). In addition, departing from their alliances with the leftists 
parties of the 1970s, the Kurdish political and intellectual elite abandoned the old communist 
slogans, the socialist economic programmes, and the aim of forming an independent 
Kurdistan, and replaced them with the seizure of the cultural rights for the Kurdish people and 
the democratic consolidation of the democratic republic (Sahin, 2008: 134). During the 1990s, 
the attempts of the Kurdish political elite to represent the Kurdish cultural and political rights 
by participating in the national politics through political parties were undermined by closure 
cases of the Constitutional Court and the public debates on the legitimacy of a party, which 
was founded on the basis of the recognition of ethnic identity (ibid., 138-139).  
Ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the state has never been tolerant to the 
expression of Kurdish identity in the public space. The Kurdish population was considered by 
the Kemalist elite as the most formidable threat against the formation of nation-state based on 
the republican, secular, modern and bureaucratic principles as well as on the homogenous 
Turkish national identity (Kaya and Tarhanlı, 2008). First, as it was evidently revealed in the 
Sheikh Sait Rebellion (1925), the Kurdish tribal leaders and religious leaders, sheikhs, who 
maintained control over the local community, constituted a potential source of rivalry to the 
central political authority.  
Second, the Kurdish people were also perceived as a rigorous impediment to the project of the 
Kemalist mode of modernisation and Westernisation due to their ‘backward, pre-modern and 
inprogressive’ communal and primordial life style based on Sufi order (tarikats), tribes, 
sheikhs, landlords, warlords and rebels (Sahin, 2008). Consequently, the increasing affiliation 
of the Kurds with the PKK, the Kurdish Workers Party (Partia Kerkeran Kurdistan) is even 
making them more intolerable for the majority Turkish nation and the state
5
.  
Since 1984, the PKK has been leading an armed struggle against the Turkish Armed Forces 
(TAF) in the southeastern region. In order to defend the Turkish territorial integrity and the 
national security, an urgent implementation of excessive military and authoritarian control 
over the governance of some cities (Martial Law) in the eastern and South Eastern regions 
was introduced in 1987, and was extended for 57 times until its abolition in 2002. Moreover, 
since 1985 the military adopted another strategy, whereby they supported and armed the 
village guards of some Kurdish tribes allying with them to counterattack the tribes involved in 
armed attacks (ibid., 137).  
                                                     
5 For more information about the Kurds, see Appendix. 
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The rise of the Kurdish ethnic nationalism, which involved the attempts of the Kurdish 
representation in the national politics, on the one hand, and the armed struggle, on the other 
was perceived as ‘a low-intensity war’ between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish state. 
The armed conflict has resulted with an increasing tension between the Turks and the Kurds 
in a way that leads to the mental division among the Kurds. Kurds are now willing to stay in 
their home cities despite the difficulties in getting jobs. Racism and institutional 
discrimination towards the Kurds in the big cities and in western Anatolia is growing day by 
day. Since the mid-1980s, the Kurds have been coupled by the majority Turkish public with 
separation, division, disintegration, terror, violence, drug trafficking, informal economics, and 
gun industry.  
 
 
3.3. 2000s: European Integration and Euroscepticism  
 
As stated earlier, Turkey was granted the right to candidacy in the Helsinki Summit of the 
European Union in December 1999. Later in 2002, the Copenhagen Summit introduced new 
concerns and discussions regarding the nature of European identity, the notion of 
Europeanization and the borders of Europe, which led to identity-based concerns regarding 
Turkey’s place in Europe and the situation of Islamic identity in European societies. 
According to Keyman and Öniş, the main concern was whether the EU aspired to become a 
global actor or rather preferred inward-oriented integration. Subsequently, while the former 
aspiration was accommodating towards Turkish membership, the latter perceived Turkey as a 
liability given the social, political and economic disparities between the EU member states 
and Turkey (Keyman and Öniş, 2007: 48-50). For the first time the Copenhagen Summit and 
the subsequent discussions linked the question of culture with European enlargement and the 
EU’s capacity to embrace cultural differences. “The discussions over Turkish accession reveal 
yet another dimension of ‘absorption capacity’, that of ‘cultural’ and ‘social’ absorption, 
which are directly related to the ‘identity’ of the Union. Jean-Louis Bourlanges, an MEP from 
a French centre-right party vocal on Turkish accession, has argued that the accession of 
Turkey will not only have a huge economic impact on the EU, but will also introduce a great 
deal of cultural and social heterogeneity that will endanger the formation of a solid and 
democratically organised political community” (Emerson et al., 2006: 3.) 
In the course of European integration,  the JDP adopted a conservative democratic ideology 
with an emphasis on secularism, social peace, social justice, the preservation of moral values 
and norms, pluralism, democracy, free market economy, civil society and good governance 
(Cınar and Duran, 2008: 31). By using such a pragmatist discourse, the JDP aimed to mobilise 
socially and economically marginalised classes, which reacted to the inequalities deriving 
from the processes of globalization and urban life (Kaya, 2004a: 16-17). Moreover, the JDP 
also became attractive for the liberal and secular bourgeoisie, upper middle and middle 
classes, who were disenchanted with the political system because of the political and 
economic instability (Özbudun and Hale, 2009: 37). The JDP immediately took an initiative 
to raise toleration and respect for the freedom of religion and conscience, and for the 
protection of religious rights such as the right to practice religion in public and private space.  
Whether the JDP’s discourse on conservative democracy and Islamic liberalism achieved to 
transform the society into a more tolerant society with respect to the recognition of religious 
freedom and rights is not certain. However, it is clear that the JDP government made 
profound attempts to force the state and the society to recognise cultural and religious 
  
differences. The protection of religious freedoms and rights became a heated debate between 
the Islamist and secular segments of society. One of the cases, where the JDP sought to 
increase the tolerance vis-a-vis the social integration of Islamist forces and to foster the 
respect for religious freedom is that the JDP government proposed a draft-law, which enabled 
the Imam Hatip (clergy high-school) graduates to study not only in the faculty of Islamic 
theology but also in other faculties (Özbudun and Hale, 2009: 86). By doing so, it made an 
attempt to eradicate the constraints, which gave rise to the social and economic segregation of 
religious and conservative segments.  
Moreover, between 2002 and 2008 the JDP made several attempts to initiate the amendments 
and decisions in the legal and institutional framework for the lift of the ban on headscarf 
(Kaya, 2009b:18).  The JDP government proposed to the Constitutional Court an amendment 
on the articles of the Constitution concerning the ban on wearing headscarf in universities 
with the expectation that this amendment would lead to the lift of the ban in 2008. Following 
the constitutional amendments, the newly elected head of the Board of the Higher Education 
(BHE), Yusuf Ziya Özcan made an announcement to the universities and stated that according 
to the constitutional change, the ban on wearing a headscarf in the Turkish universities was 
lifted. However, the Court repudiated the lift of the ban ultimately.
6
 As a consequence, the 
appearance/ existence of conservative and Islamist segments in the socio-economic sphere 
was recognised/accepted as an everyday reality although (in)tolerance/(dis)respect for the 
expression of faith and wearing religious clothes still remained as a highly debated topic in 
the public. 
On the other hand, it should be thoroughly questioned whether the quest of the JDP for the 
recognition of religious freedom and rights through the adoption of the discourses on 
conservative democracy was equally carried out in every social cleavage, and particularly, in 
the case of religious minorities. Before the 2007 elections, even though the JDP took an 
initiative to accommodate the Alevis in the Sunni-dominant order, the party was primarily 
concerned with gaining more votes from the Alevis (Kaya, 2009b:17). The Alevis were not 
equally treated in the JDP’s policy to transform the society to become more tolerant for the 
expression of faith and religious rights. The JDP failed to accommodate the Alevis into the 
social sphere and continued to retain the Sunni-dominant social order since it did not 
recognise the Cemevis (Alevi communion houses) as places of worship in addition to 
mosques, and insisted on the inclusion of the Alevi children in the assignment of the 
compulsory courses of religion in the secondary school education (ibid., 18). Therefore, one 
should contend that the JDP’s policies to stimulate the social sensitivities for the toleration 
and recognition of the religious minorities and the protection of religious rights were 
confined to the Sunni conservative and Islamist segments.
7
  
In the legal and institutional framework, since February 2002, it is also possible to find 
various reform policies for the recognition and protection of ethnic minority rights, which 
manifested a great shift in the discursive position taken by the political elite. Since the 
Accession Partnership Programme and the National Programme (March 2001) addressed at 
the recognition of ethno-cultural diversity, the former coalition government and the JDP 
government enacted and enforced reform packages and policies to accommodate ethno-
cultural diversity, and in a broader sense, to secure the individual rights, liberties and human 
                                                     
6 For a detailed analysis of the headscarf debate see the Turkish Daily News webpage, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=95065, access date 8 May 2010. 
7 For further information on this initiative see the Turkish Daily News webpage, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=80103&contact=1, accessed 10 May 2010. 
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rights within the framework of the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. With the  
initial reform packages put into force between 2002 and 2004, first, they reduced the role of 
the military in politics by removing the military origin judges from the State Security Courts, 
and eventually abolishing these courts, removing the military members from the High Audio 
Visual Board (RTÜK) and the Board of Higher Education (BHE), weakening the military 
impact on the judiciary, civilianising the National Security Council (NSC) and restricting its 
role to a consultative body, and by bringing the extra-budgetary funds of the military under 
the general budget of the Defence Ministry (Kaya, 2009; Sahin, 2008).  
Secondly, they reinforced the individual rights, liberties and human rights versus the 
authoritarian and unitary state by loosening the law on the freedom of association and 
demonstration, abolishing the death penalty and all means and practices of tortures by the 
security forces, revising the Penal Code, abolishing the term of ‘forbidden language’ from the 
Press law, permitting limited broadcast in Kurdish in the private radio and TV channels, 
introducing limited broadcast in Arabic, Circassian, and various dialects of the Kurdish such 
as Kurmançi and Zaza on the national radio and TV channels, and by allowing the ethnic 
languages and dialects to be taught in private courses (ibid.). Consequently, the reform 
packages, which were adopted to raise the social awareness of tolerance and acceptance of 
ethno-cultural minorities, encouraged ethno-cultural groups to vocalise their claims through 
legitimate political channels.  
Since 2001, the governments took initiatives to remedy the civil and cultural rights of non-
Muslim minorities through legal amendments. In accordance with the Copenhagen Political 
Criteria, the constitutional amendments expanded the individual rights and liberties to every 
citizen and provided the structural arrangements for democratic consolidation and the 
enhancement of the rule of law and human rights (Oran, 2004). The EU Reform Packages 
partially and gradually restored civil and cultural rights conceded to the non-Muslim 
minorities with the Lausanne Agreement (LA) (ibid.).  
In the nation-state formation process, the state elite of the Republic inherited from the 
Ottoman the discourse and practices of the homogenous nation based on the Sunni Islam and 
the exclusion of the non-Muslim minorities. The Kemalist definition of nationalism was also 
discriminative against the non-Muslim minorities since it incorporated the element of Islam 
into the so-called modern secular national identity. The configuration of the majority and 
minority elements of the Turkish nation were also inscribed in the (1923) during the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic. According to LA, the non-Muslim minorities
8
 were 
officially categorised and recognised as ‘minorities’ resting upon their ethnic and religious 
differences whereas Kurds, Alevis, Circassians
9
 and other Muslim elements belonged to the 
Turkish nation (Türk Uyruklu) constituting the majority (Oran, 2000).  
 
With the EU Reform packages, the ban on establishing associations for the preservation and 
diffusion of languages and cultures other than Turkish and traditional to minorities was 
abolished; the use of the ‘forbidden language’ was re-legalised in the law of associations; the 
restrictions on learning and publishing in different languages and dialects other than Turkish 
were abandoned; the right to acquire intangible property of the foundations belonging to the 
non-Muslim minorities was restored by a change in the law on foundations and was initially 
                                                     
8 For more information about Greek, Jewish and Armenian and other non-Muslim minorities, see Appendix. 
9 For more information about Circussians, see Appendix. 
  
subjected to the decisions of the cabinet and later to the General Secretary of Foundations 
(Vakıflar Genel Mudurlugu), and the limitation on the names other than Turkish was 
abolished by a change in the law on population. Furthermore, recently the European Union 
General Secretariat in Ankara has decided to drop the use of the term ‘non-Muslims’ in 
identifying officially recognized minorities in Turkey. Seeking to update the government’s 
terminology for the 21st century, Turkey’s chief negotiator for European Union affairs has 
announced a decision to use the term “different belief groups” instead of “gayrimüslim” (non-
Muslim) in official EU correspondence. The decision was taken after the Chief Negotiator 
Egemen Bagis received a letter from the vice patriarch of the Ancient Syriac Orthodox 
Church, Yusuf Çetin, who pointed out that “Muslim” means “believer” in Aramaic, a 
northwest Semitic language used in ancient times as the everyday speech of Syria. As such, 
the term “gayrimüslim,” which has been the preferred term for non-Muslims in Turkey, 
implied “nonbelievers.”10 
Furthermore, the discursive shift from ‘majority nationalism’ to ‘diversity as an ideology’ 
fostered by the governing party created an incentive for a change in the every-day life for the 
social motivation toward toleration of ethno-religious rights of non-Muslim minorities. The 
political elite, the Turkish and Armenian intellectuals and civil society organisations were 
induced to open public discussion on the taboo issues involving the Armenian ‘genocide’, the 
Armenian ethnic minority rights, the Armenian-Turkish diplomatic relations and the impact of 
the Armenian Diaspora on the problems related to the Armenians
11
.  
Strikingly, the debates on the Armenian ‘genocide’ both at the state and society levels have 
been good examples of the rising aspiration of toleration for the Armenian ethnic and cultural 
rights. One of these cases of the rising tolerance was the highly debated and polemical 
conference on ‘Ottoman Armenians during the Demise of the Empire’ held at Istanbul Bilgi 
University in 2005 (Kaya, 2009b). Although some ultranationalists brought a lawsuit on the 
organisers of the conference and the court partly considered their claims rightful and lawful, 
this conference became a good indicator of eradicating the biased views on the Armenian 
issue (ibid.).  
On the other hand, it should be also pointed out that the EU Reforms on civil and cultural 
rights of non-Muslim minorities could not be brought into practice in an immediate and 
effective way because its application was obscured and delayed by bureaucratic obstacles and 
the interference of National Security Council, the intelligence agencies and the Security 
Forces (ibid.). Since 2004, none of the applications for the approval of non-Muslim 
foundations has been approved, and 18.66% of the applications for the acquisition of 
intangible properties belonging to the existing foundations have been approved (ibid.)
12
. By 
looking at the constraints in bringing the EU reforms on non-Muslim minorities into practice, 
one could maintain that the dominant discourse of ‘non-Turkish’ and ‘foreign’ non-Muslim 
minorities is still prevalent, and therefore, the Turkish state is still reluctant to accommodate 
tolerance, recognition or acceptance in everyday life.  
 
 
                                                     
10http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=gayrimuslim-replaced-by-8220different-belief-groups8221-2010-06-27, 
accessed on 30 June 2010. 
11 For more information about Armenians, see Appendix. 
12 For more information on the developments of the establishment of non-Muslim foundaitons approved by the government 
see Oran (2004:133-134). 
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4. Discourses and Practices of (In)Tolerance in the Age of Euroscepticism 
 
From 17 December 2004 to 3 October 2005, when EU state and national government leaders 
decided to start negotiations with Turkey, tensions began to rise between nationalist, patriotic, 
statist, pro-status-quo groups on the one hand and pro-EU groups on the other hand. This was 
the time when the virtuous cycle of the period between 1999 and 2005 was replaced with the 
vicious cycle starting from the late 2005. A new nationalist and religious wave embraced the 
country, especially among middle-class and upper middle-class groups. The actual start of the 
accession negotiations in 2005 was a turning point towards Euroscepticism. This was also 
observed in several previous cases during the accession negotiations of the 2004/2007 
entrants. Political elites and the government come to realize that accession negotiations are 
not in fact “negotiations” but rather a unilateral imposition from the EU. The only 
“negotiable” matters that would benefit the candidate are generally some minor exceptions 
and hardly bargained transition periods. Furthermore, this reality of actual accession 
negotiations is often abused by politicians to unfoundedly blame many governmental actions 
onto the EU. Be the “blaming of Brussels” honest or not, the overall impact on public support 
is almost surely negative.  
Euroscepticism, nationalism and parochialism in Turkey were triggered by the disapproving 
sentiments towards the American occupation of Iraq, the limitations on national sovereignty 
posed by the EU integration, the high tide of the 90th anniversary of the Armenian 
“deportation”/“genocide” among the Armenian diaspora (2005), the “risk of recognition” of 
Southern Cyprus by Turkey for the sake of the EU integration, anti-Turkey public opinion in 
the EU countries (e.g. France and Austria) framed by conservative powers, and Israel’s 
attacks on Lebanon in 2006. Against such a background the state elite has also become very 
sceptical of the Europeanization process. The best way to explain the sources of such a kind 
of scepticism among the state elite is to refer to the “Sevres Syndrome”, which is based on a 
fear deriving from the post-World War I era characterized with a popular belief regarding the 
risk of the break-up of the Turkish state (Öniş, 2004: 12).13  
Against this background, the JDP immediately set back from its pro-European position as it 
was perceived by the Party that the EU no longer paid off. Actually, it is not the nationalist 
climax in the country which turned the JDP into a Eurosceptical party, but it was the decision 
of the European Court of Human Rights vis-a-vis the headscarf case brought by Leyla Sahin 
v. Turkey challenging a Turkish law which bans wearing the Islamic headscarf at universities 
and other educational and state institutions. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) heard a particularly monumental case called Leyla Sahin v. Turkey. It was 
monumental because the Grand Chamber agreed to hear Sahin’s case at all. And two previous 
admissions to the European Human Rights Commission concerning the Turkish headscarf 
were ruled inadmissible. In Sahin’s case, however, the outcome equalled temporary defeat for 
headscarf supporters. The court ruled that there had been no violation to Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion); 
Article 10 (freedom of expression); Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 2, 
Protocol No.1 (right to education) (ECHR, 2004). In short, the Grand Chamber concluded that 
the interference/violations of fundamental rights concerning headscarf were acceptable and 
                                                     
13 Sévres Syndrome derives from the Sévres Peace Treaty signed by the Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire in 1920 in 
the aftermath of the World War I, leading to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. 
  
legitimate. In addition to these rulings, Grand Chamber stated that the interference to her 
education triggered by her wearing a headscarf was found to be necessary for protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others and maintaining public order. While the Chamber recognized 
that the ban interfered with Sahin’s right to publicly express her religion, it stated that the ban 
was acceptable if it was imposed to protect the rights of third parties, to preserve public order, 
and to safeguard the principles of secularism and equality in Turkey. Since the ECHR is an 
institution within the framework of the Council of Europe, to which Turkey is a member since 
1949, it could be difficult to see how its judgment could have an impact on the support for the 
EU membership. The only way, then, could be that Euroscepticism is understood as a general 
perception and attitude towards Europe, not only towards the EU and the prospect of 
membership. This is actually a remarkable phenomenon indicating that Europe and European 
Union are often interchangeably used in Turkey. 
The Eurosceptic attitude towards the EU-accession could be found not only in the JDP 
government and among Turkish nationalists and pro-status quo groups. Rather, after 2005, the 
Kurdish people also became arduously critical of the EU reforms with a growing sentiment of 
Euroscepticism (Kaya, 2009b). In parallel with the suspicion of the sufficiency and the 
efficiency of the JDP attempts to recognise the Kurdish identity, the revocation of the concept 
‘minority’ in the Progress Report in 2004 provoked some of the Kurdish nationalists to 
reemphasize their position against the Turkish majority nationalism. A considerable fraction 
among the Kurds claimed that they denounced the concept ‘minority’ because it rendered 
them a ‘degrading’, ‘inferior’ and ‘unequal’ status versus the Turkish people (Sahin, 
2008:144). Rather, this fraction defended their claim that the Kurdish people were one of ‘the 
constitutive elements’ of the Turkish Republic, and therefore, had a status equal to that of the 
Turks. Considering themselves as the ‘constitutive element’ rather than a minority, the Kurds 
fervently alleged that their characteristics which distinguish them from other minorities 
should be recognised, and the equality to the Turkish majority in living conditions should be 
secured (ibid). In other words, even though this demand gives the Kurds a distinctive status in 
comparison to the other ethnic and religious minorities, it is sound in the sense that it 
remarkably denotes to the right of ‘equal citizenship’. 
It has also been suggested that although the EU reforms on the protection of ethnic minorities 
culminated in an open public debate, they did not achieve to take a concrete and significant 
step towards the settlement of the Kurdish problem (Somer, 2010). The Kurdish Democratic 
Society Movement (DTH) declared in 2004 that the objectives of the movement involved the 
support for the EU accession, the resolution of the Kurdish problem by peaceful and 
democratic means and with respect to territorial integrity, and the adoption of a new 
democratic and universal constitution (hurriyetim.com.tr, 22.10.2004).
14
 The DTH, which 
abandoned the secessionist and federalist claims, put forth its demands for the adoption of  
‘constitutional citizenship’, the abolition of the 10% national threshold in the electoral law, 
the liberalisation of equal participation for all political parties, and social and economic 
development in the Kurdish populated regions (Radikal, 26.05.2004)
15
. Thus, considering the 
definition of ‘minority’ in the Turkish political context and on the Kurdish political party, one 
                                                     
14 For more information about the declaration of the DTH see “Eski DEP’lilerden Demokratik Toplum Hareketi (The 
Democratic Society Movement from the former members of the DEP) http://hurriyetim.com.tr, 22 October 2004 accessed 
on 13 June 2010  
15 For more information on the demands of the Kurdish civil society acitivists and intellectuals see Y. Alataş “AB Eşiğinde 
Kürt Sorunu Yazı Dizisi” (The Series on the Kurdish Question on the Verge of the EU Accession), Radikal (27 May 
2004). 
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should carry on debating whether the EU reforms adopted by the JDP government aim to 
merely tolerate cultural and individual rights of the Kurdish minority, or are designed as an 
initial stage drifting towards a national project for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and the 
recognition/acceptance/respect of the difference of the Kurds.  
It was possible to find the examples of intolerance influenced by the upsurge of radical 
nationalism in the practices of everyday life. In March 2005, two Kurdish children allegedly 
burnt the Turkish flag during the Newroz celebrations (hurriyet.com.tr, 21.03.2005).
16
 Six 
month after the Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Diyarbakir in 2005 where he declared his 
full support of the solution of the Kurdish problem with respect to democracy, the Kurdish 
people in this city rioted in the funerals of four PKK members (Somer, 2010). In the 
following months, the casualties caused by the PKK attacks increased.  
It should also be underlined that the Turkish majority nationalism increased as a response to 
the rising Kurdish nationalism as well as to Euroscepticism. In retaliation to the issue of flag 
burning in Mersin (21 March 2005), some public figures started flag campaigns in the name 
of ‘responsible statesmanship’ (Hurriyet.com.tr, 21.03.2005)17. The ‘waved and unwaved 
flags’ (Billig, 1995:10) obviously indicated the cases of the rise of intolerance where the 
nationalist and sceptic attitudes of both Kurdish and Turkish people were provoked in regard 
to the national and ethnic conflict. Hence, the intolerance, ethnic conflict and violence 
increased at the time when the Kurdish people became increasingly critical of the suitability 
and the sufficiency of the JDP government’s EU reforms for the recognition of ethno-cultural 
identity and the resolution of identity-related issues, and the sceptical and nationalist attitude 
towards the ‘Other’ was strengthened by the Turks and the Kurds.    
Finally, it is also possible to find striking cases where the social intolerance, unacceptability, 
non-recognition and even hatred towards the Armenians reached its peak and even involved 
violent conflict. The most conspicuous of these cases was the assassination of the prominent 
Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink in January 2007.  It was claimed by some journalists in the 
media that the assassination of Hrant Dink could be linked to a reaction of ultranationalists, 
who were agitated by the verdict of guilty for Hrant Dink on the denigration of Turkishness in 
one of his articles (ibid.). In 2005, Hrant Dink was sentenced to six months’ conditional 
imprisonment on account of ‘insulting Turkish national identity’ according to the article 301 
of the Penal Code (ibid.). The article 301 of the Penal Code considers a criminal somebody 
who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey 
and sentences him/her to imprisonment between six months and three years (ibid.). Moreover, 
the rise of Euroscepticism and the reinvigoration of national identity as a response to the 
upsurge of identity politics based on ethnic and religious difference after the articulation of 
the concept of ‘minority’ in the 2005 Progress Report also aggravated intolerance and 
conflict between the Turkish nationalists and the Armenian minorities. For example, in March 
2005 the 80
th
 anniversary of the Gallipoli Victory was celebrated in an exaggerated manner in 
retaliation to the 90
th
 anniversary activities of the Armenian exodus (hurriyet.com.tr, 
17.03.2005)
18
.  
                                                     
16 For more information about the incident of burning flags see http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/21/616617.asp, 
accessed on 14 June 2010 
17 For more information about the flag campaigns see http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/21/616617.asp, accessed on 14 
June 2010 
18 For more information on the celebration for the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli Victory on 19 March 2005 see 
http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/18/615296.asp, accessed on 14 June 2010 
  
Hence, it is argued that the shift in the discourse from ‘majority nationalism’ to ‘diversity as 
an ideology’ through the EU reforms and the attempts of the JDP did not result in a 
substantial change in the attitude of the Sunni-Turkish majority towards the toleration and 
acceptance of ethno-cultural and religious diversity for non-Turks and non-Muslim minorities 
such as Armenians .  
 
 
5. Conclusion: The Myth of Tolerance in Turkey  
 
The concept of tolerance has a very long history in the Turkish context tracing back to the 
Ottoman Empire. It also has a very popular usage in everyday life. Turks are usually proud of 
referring to the The Millet System of the Ottoman Empire is often known to be the guarantor 
of tolerance, respecting the boundaries between religious communities. Such an official 
discourse is still carried out in contemporary Turkey, although it is evident that it is just a 
myth. The myth of tolerance was functional to conceal the mistreatment of ethno-cultural and 
religious minorities other than the majority of Sunni-Muslim-Turks in Turkey. The term 
tolerance has become more viable in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of the European 
Union in 1999. Whether a cultural diversity challenge is tackled in relation to the concept 
‘tolerance’ or other concepts such as ‘recognition’/‘acceptance’ or assimilation, expulsion 
and persecution, depends on the historical form of a particular state.  
The definition of tolerance is confined to the acceptance of Sunni Muslims and their secular 
counterparts under the banner of the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish nation. However, it does not 
mean to embrace all different kinds of ethno-cultural and religious minorities. As Karen 
Barkey (2008: 110), a famous Ottoman historian, stated earlier, toleration in the Ottoman 
context as well as in other imperial contexts refers to the “absence of persecution of people 
but not their acceptance into society as full and welcomed members of community”. 
Toleration is actually nothing but a form of governmentality, designed to maintain peace and 
order in multi-ethnic and multi-nominational contexts. The Ottoman imperial experience and 
the Turkish national experience approve that the Turkish nation tolerate those non-Muslims, 
non-Sunni-Muslims and non-Turks as long as they did not disturb or go against the Sunni-
Islam-Turkish order. If ethno-cultural and religious minorities did transgress, their recognition 
could easily turn into suppression and persecution. 
 
Appendix: Information on Minorities 
19
 
 Armenians: Armenians are one of the indigenous peoples living in Anatolia and are 
mostly Gregorian Orthodox, less Catholic and Protestant. The Armenian population in 
Anatolia substantially decreased as a result of the massacres during the 1915 exodus 
carried out by the ‘Union and Progress’ government and of the streams of emigration. The 
Armenians who developed a distinct Armenian identity live mostly in Istanbul and 
number between 55.000 and 60.000. Gregorian Orthodox Armenians are committed to the 
Armenian patriarchy established by the initiative of the Mehmet II in Kumkapı, Istanbul 
in 1461. Armenians publish in Armenian two daily newspapers called Jamanak and 
Marmara, and in Turkish a weekly newspaper called Agos.  
                                                     
19 For all of the statistical information on minorities see Oran (2004: 50-61). 
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 Jews: The Jews are not mostly of indigenous people of Anatolia, although there is a small 
autochtonous minority of Karai Jews. Rather, most of the Jews come from the Sefarad 
Jews who fled from Spain and Portugal and migrated to the Ottoman Empire at the end of 
15
th
 century. They speak Ladino, which is a dialect of Spanish. They have been known to 
be loyal to the Ottomans ever since they came to the Empire. There was a massive 
migration to Israel in 1940s after the establishment of the Israeli state. The conformist 
attitude of the Jews did not prevent them from being adversely affected by the incidents of 
6-7 September 1955 and the 1942 Wealth Tax. It is estimated that there are approximately 
40.000 Jews in contemporary Turkey. It is also known that the hostility towards the Jews 
has recently increased due to the killing of 9 Turks by the Israeli soldiers in the Gazza 
flotilla on 31 May 2010 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news /10195838).   
 Greeks:  Greeks are also one of the autochtonous populations of Anatolia, and are mostly 
Orthodox, and less Catholic and Protestant. The Orthodox Greeks of Anatolia were 
required to migrate to Greece according to the agreement on the population exchange 
signed with Greece in Lausanne, 1923. However, the Greeks living in Istanbul, Bozcaada 
and Imroz Islands were allowed to stay like the Turkish origin Greek citizens living in the 
western Trace. Therefore, as a result of the War of Independence and the population 
exchange, 1.190.000 Greeks migrated to Greece and only 110.000 Greeks stayed in 
Turkey. The disruption of the relations between Turkey and Greece as a result of the 1964 
Cypriot issue also escalated the emigration of the Greeks, and their number decreased 
nearly to 3.000. The Orthodox Greeks are committed to the Greek patriarchy in Phanar, 
Istanbul. They publish two daily newspapers called Iho and Apoyevmatini.  
 Assyrians: There is a common belief in Turkey, shaped by the official discourse and 
internalised by the society that the LA, by which non-Muslim minorities were officially 
recognised and acquired civil and cultural rights,  mostly addresses at those ‘three large 
minorities’ among non-Muslim populations. On the other hand, Assyrians, Nasturis, 
Yezidis, and Protestants are also non-Muslim populations living in Turkey. The civil and 
cultural rights of the latter minorities were secured with the LA as much as those of the 
‘three large minorities’. Severely affected by the armed conflict and the terrorist activities 
of the PKK in South Eastern Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, the Assyrians migrated to 
Istanbul first, and from there to Europe, mostly to Sweden. According to their own 
statements, the number of Assyrians decreased to 3.000 in the South Eastern region and to 
50.000 in Istanbul. Besides the Assyrians, it has been discovered from their own statement 
that there are approximately 10.000 Bahai people and 1.500 Protestants.    
 EU Citizens: Bianca Kaiser and Ahmet İçduygu (2005) state that there are more than 
170.000 EU citizens permanently residing in Turkey. This number is likely to increase as 
Turkey is becoming more and more Europeanized in the accession process. Most of these 
EU citizens are the posted European personnel and their families, EU spouses of Turkish 
citizens, descendants of EU spouses of Turkish citizens who mostly have dual citizenship, 
retired EU citizens who are increasingly buying property and settling along Turkish 
sunbelt-coast (Bodrum, Marmaris, Antalya, Alanya), alternative life-style seekers, EU 
citizens of Turkish origin who mostly have ‘pink card’ (pembe kağıt), which gives them 
basically the same rights except political rights as Turkish citizens with respect to 
residence, access to the labour market, inheritance etc., Bosphorus Germans (and other 
Europeans) who are the descendants of tradespeople, military personnel and academics 
who came to Turkey during the Ottoman Empire, and finally Refugees fleeing Nazi 
Regime (1933-42/3) who were the Refugees of Jewish origin as well as political refugees 
  
having large impact on Turkish higher education system (Istanbul University) in law, 
medicine, economics, architecture, biology etc. 
 Arabs: The official research on population indicates that there are approximately 
1.000.000 Arabs in Turkey. Of them, around 300.000-350.000 Arabs living in and around 
Mardin, Urfa, and Siirt are Sunni, and around 200.000 Arabs living around Mersin, Adana 
and Antakya are Alevi. The rest of the Arab population are diffused to various parts of the 
country. Sunni Arabs do not challenge the superior Turkish identity with their religious 
identity, whereas Alevi Arabs residing in the South emphasise their Alevi identity resting 
upon religious and ethnic difference. 
 Alevis: Most of the Alevis are of the Turkoman origin. Alevi population is divided into 
four categories on the basis of the language they speak.  The total population of Alevis 
living in Turkey approximately reach to 12.000.000: 1) Alevis who speak Azerbaijani 
dialect of Turkish: Their religious belief and practice is similar to the Shia religion in Iran. 
They live in Kars and have a small number of population; 2) Alevis who speak Arabic: 
Arab Alevis originate from the Nusayri community in Syria and live around Mersin, 
Adana and Antakya. They have no historical affiliation with other Alevis in Turkey and 
are different from them in identifying themselves with the Alevi identity prior to the 
Turkish identity; 3) Alevis who speak Turkish: This is the most influential and most 
crowded group. Although they are from the Turkoman ethnic origin, they have the 
strongest sentiment of being a religious minority; and 4) Alevis who speak Zaza and 
Kurdish: The population of this group number nearly 3.000.000. It is also known that 25% 
of the Kurdish population are Alevi. They form a minority within the Alevi and Kurdish 
origin populations.  
 Balkan and Caucasian Muslims:  Bosnians, Torbes, Pomaks and Albanians are the 
ethnic minority people who originate from the Slavic Muslims and come from the Balkans 
and the Caucasus. Roma people who come from the same region in an unknown date can 
also be added to this group. Georgians are an ethnic minority group who come from the 
Caucasus. There are no certain findings proving that the Laz community come from this 
region. Circassians and Georgians fled from the Russia and migrated to Anatolia in the 
19
th
 century. It has been claimed that the number of the Circassians is around 2,5 million, 
and they speak Adige language. Whereas the Balkan migrants do not have a particular 
consciousness of forming an ethnic minority, Circassians have begun to develop a 
separate identity in the 2000s with their cuisine, the declaration they publish in 
newspapers as regard to the conflicts in the Caucasus, the newspapers and magazines they 
publish such as Çveneburi, Pirosmani, Nart, Jineps, Ogni, and the Caucasian associations 
they establish (Kaya, 2004b and 2005).  
 Kurds: The Kurdish population in Turkey is between 12.000.000 and 15.000.000. 75% of 
them are Sunni, and 25% are Alevis. The majority of Kurds speak the Kırmance 
(Kurmanci) dialect of Kurdish and a minority speak Zaza. More detailed information 
about the Kurdish population and their relation with the Turkish majority and the Turkish 
state was given above. 
 Romas: There is little information regarding the numbers of Romani or other groups. The 
most effective overview of the Gypsies of Turkey has been produced by a Romani 
scholar, Anna Oprisan (2002) working closely with the Roman communities themselves. 
On the whole, the Romas of Turkey do not respond affirmatively to the suggestion that 
they constitute an ethnic group, as this is clearly seen to be outside of the identity matrix 
Turkish/Muslim/Roman and family/clan/mahalle (community). Historically speaking, the 
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degree of integration experienced by Turkish Romas has been greater, until relatively 
modern times. During the Ottoman Empire they were well respected by the state as they 
had strong guild associations. However, there are a number of legal impediments to 
integration of Romas. 
 
 
Secularist-Islamist Polarization in Turkey 
 
 
Source: Source: Çarkoğlu, Ali and Binnaz Toprak (2006). Religion, Society and Politics in 
Changing Turkey. TESEV Publications: Istanbul.  
 
 
Question: We often hear about "Islamists" and "Secularists" in Turkey. Where would you 
place yourself on this scale?  
The data from the survey conducted in 2006, provides insight to the division of the 
polarization of the society with regards to secularism and Islam. According to the reports, 
while 20% of the participants placed themselves towards the secularist end, 49% places 
themselves towards the Islamist side. 
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